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Hobbs: Cable TV's "Must Carry" Rules: The Most Restrictive Alternative -

CABLE TV'S "MUST CARRY" RULES: THE MOST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE-Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC.
INTRODUCTION

How should the first amendment balance the interests of cable
television system operators against the interests of a community's
television stations? The Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) maintains that it must protect the public interest by ensuring that television audiences have access to free local programming. Cable systems assert that they have the constitutional right
to provide whatever cable channels and services their subscribers
desire.
In Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,1 the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the cable operator's first
amendment rights should prevail. 2 The court held as unconstitutional the FCC's "must carry" rules that required a cable system,
on the request of a local television broadcaster and without compensation, to carry all local broadcast television stations.3 Using an
"incidental burden on speech" test devised in United States v.
O'Brien," the court found that the rules were based solely on the
FCC's speculative fear that cable would eradicate local broadcasting and that the rules were overly broad in their application.3
This note first argues that the court correctly applied the least
scrutinizing first amendment test to the facts of the case and concluded its inquiry after the rules failed that test. Second, this note
argues that the FCC, while once on the correct regulatory path regarding cable, erred by not studying the potential impact of cable
television on a case by case basis as the FCC had decided to do
with competing broadcasters in Carroll Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC.'
Third, this note concludes that the Quincy case will benefit cable
operators financially and will provide proper protection of cable
1. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Nat'l Ass'n
of Broadcasters v. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 54 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Sept. 23, 1985)

(No. 85-502).
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Id. at 1452, 1462-63.
Id.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
768 F.2d at 1463.
258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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operators' right of free speech.
THE CASE

The Quincy case involved two separate actions that were filed
to challenge the application of the must carry rules. Quincy Cable
TV, Inc., the owner of a cable system, challenged an FCC ruling
that it comply with the rules despite the limited channel capacity
of its cable system. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc., a supplier of
programming to cable systems, wanted the FCC to institute
rulemaking to essentially delete the must carry rules. The court in
Quincy combined the two challenges into one case.7
A.

Quincy Cable TV, Inc.

On November 27, 1979, Quincy Cable TV, Inc., a cable system
in Grant County, Washington, 8 filed a request with the FCC for a
waiver of the cable television mandatory signal carriage rules. 9
Quincy Cable argued that the three television broadcast stations
that it desired to delete' 0 could be received in the town of Quincy
without cable, and that alternative programming would better
serve its subscribers." The Quincy cable system was limited to a
twelve channel capacity. In 1979 Quincy Cable conducted a subscriber survey to determine what channels it should carry. Quincy
Cable found that subscribers preferred to watch three cable channels"2 instead of the three local channels from Spokane, Washington. Quincy Cable was already carrying three network affiliates
from Seattle, Washington (which largely duplicated the three Spokane stations), a Spokane public broadcasting station, and four
public affairs and entertainment channels.' 3 Quincy Cable petitioned the FCC in November 1979 for the waiver 4 even though it
7. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1438 n.5, 1445, 1447.
8. Quincy Cable TV, Inc., 89 F.C.C.2d 1128-29 & n.1 (1982).
9. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1128.
10. KREM, KHQ-TV, and KXLY-TV, located in Spokane, Washington. 89
F.C.C.2d at 1128 n.1. Spokane is located about 125 miles from Quincy, Washington. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1446.
11. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1128-29.
12. That is, programming supplied specifically for cable audiences by cable
programmers, such as Turner Broadcasting System. 768 F.2d at 1437 n.1.
13. Of the twelve channels, only the four Spokane channels could be received
in Quincy without cable, and only then with the aid of a UHF translator station.
768 F.2d at 1446 & n.25.
14. Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 730 F.2d 1549, 1550 (1984).
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was not yet obliged under the rules 5 to carry the Spokane stations
since none had yet requested carriage. 16
In a letter ruling effective May 2, 1980, the Cable Television
Bureau Chief denied the petition.1 7 Two requests for reconsideration were denied. 8 Nevertheless, Quincy Cable deleted two of the
Spokane stations 9 and petitioned the full Commission for review.
Quincy Cable argued that the Bureau's order was defective as to
procedure and as to constitutional law. Arguing that the must
carry rules infringed on its editorial discreti6n over programming,
Quincy Cable contended that the rules were unconstitutional
2
0
under the first amendment.2 The FCC rejected the argument. '
The FCC in Quincy reiterated that the must carry rules assured that local broadcast television stations are carried on cable
systems, allowing access to the local audience that the stations are
licensed to serve. The three Spokane stations were the only ones
that were entitled to mandatory carriage, and after Quincy Cable
deleted two of the stations, the system "saturated its channels with
non-mandatory signals. ' 22 The FCC fined Quincy Cable $5,000 for
violating Section 76.57(a)23 by deleting the Spokane stations.2 4 The
FCC suggested that Quincy expand its channel capacity to fulfill
its signal carriage obligations.25
Quincy Cable appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals. Quincy Cable's brief emphasized its limited
twelve channel capacity, but Quincy Cable had expanded its system capacity to twenty-four channels in June 1982 and to thirtytwo channels by January 1983, the latter being one year prior to
oral arguments before the court of appeals. The new system used
15. The must carry rules only impose the obligation on the cable operator
once the local broadcast station requests carriage. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57(a), 76.59(a),
76.61(a) (1980).
16. 768 F.2d at 1446-47.
17. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1129.
18. 730 F.2d at 1550.
19. KHQ-TV and KREM. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1129.
20. Quincy Cable also argued that the rules violated its fifth amendment
rights since they constituted a compensable taking. 768 F.2d at 1447 n.27. The
Commission rejected the argument without substantive discussion. 89 F.C.C.2d at
1134.
21. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1134-35.
22. Id. at 1137.
23. 47 C.F.R. § 76.57(a) (1980).
24. 89 F.C.C.2d at 1138.
25. Id. at 1137.
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converters and differently priced groups of channels. When these
facts came to light, the court remanded the case to the FCC for
reconsideration within six months.26
The FCC, on remand, reaffirmed its earlier decision despite
Quincy Cable's supplementary filings.27
B.

Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.

Turner Broadcasting System petitioned the FCC in 1980 to institute rulemaking regarding the must carry rules. Turner contended that the rules should be deleted since the cable industry
and FCC regulatory policy had changed significantly since the
1960's, disproving the theoretical economic assumptions on which
the rules were based. Turner also argued that the rules were
unconstitutional.2 8
Turner asserted injury since it could not sell its programs to
those cable systems that were saturated 29 with mandatory local signals." Turner also argued that the rules injured systems that were
less saturated since such systems were still restricted in the number of nonlocal channels that they could carry. 3
The FCC delayed action, and Turner petitioned the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to compel the FCC to act. On
March 23, 1984, the court remanded the case to the FCC for action. The FCC then denied the petition for rulemaking, stating
that the rules still had a valid purpose and that Turner had failed
to show otherwise. 32 The FCC acknowledged that the rules were
"'intended to compel carriage of broadcasting signals in place of
alternate programming that subscribers, if given their choice,
might otherwise choose.' 33 The FCC also conceded that the rules
deprived cable operators of a choice in deciding what cable chan34
nels to carry.
26. 730 F.2d at 1549-51.
27. 768 F.2d at 1447.
28. Id. at 1445.
29. I.e., a twelve channel system being forced to carry the signals of twelve
"local" stations, thus precluding any additional "cable" channels. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Docket No. 21472-"Saturated" Cable Television Systems,
66 F.C.C.2d 710 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Saturated Cable Systems].
30. 768 F.2d at 1445 & n.24.
31. Id. at 1445.
32. Id. at 1446, citing the Commission's Opinion and Order.
33. Id.

34. Id.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/7
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Turner petitioned the court of appeals for review of the Com36
mission's denial.
C.

"Must Carry" Rules Held Unconstitutional

On July 19, 1985, a unanimous District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the FCC's mandatory carriage rules violated the first amendment to the United States Constitution.." In
an opinion authored by Judge J. Skelly Wright,17 the court first
discussed the regulatory background3 8 and the prior constitutional
challenges39 to cable regulation in general. As to the latter, the
court found that the Supreme Court had never reviewed a constitutional challenge to the must carry rules, except as to the FCC's
proper jurisdiction in promulgating the rules.4 0 The Quincy court
acknowledged that cable operators who had challenged the regulations had been unsuccessful in the federal circuits.4 '
The first amendment standard of review presented some
problems for the court in Quincy. The court rejected the "scarcity"
rationale, which is a justification for a more intrusive restriction on
a broadcaster's first amendment rights, since that rationale is limited to regulating broadcast media.2
The court then focused on the test set out in United States v.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1438.
37. The other circuit judges were Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Robert H. Bork.
Id. at 1437.
38. 768 F.2d at 1438-43.
39. Id. at 1443-45. The court dismissed the FCC's view that the Supreme
Court had sustained the validity of the rules in a footnote in United States v.
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). The Supreme Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 697 n.7 (1979) clearly refuted that footnote as
dicta. See Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1443 n.20.
40. Id. at 1443 & n.20.
41. E.g., Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968)
(cable operators analogized to broadcasters in justifying a regulation more intrusive on first amendment rights); Buckeye Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 387 F.2d 220,
225 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (regulation was no more restrictive on speech than was necessary to preserve local broadcasting). These two cases were specifically rejected by
the D.C. Circuit in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45 n.80 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).

42. The courts have held that the fact that only a finite number of frequencies can be assigned to broadcasters justifies a regulation more intrusive on first
amendment rights than a regulation on other media such as newspapers. Quincy,
768 F.2d at 1448-50.
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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O'Brien.4 3 In deciding to apply the test, the court first discussed
the distinction between regulations causing incidental burdens on
speech,4 4 and those that are intended to curtail expression.45 The
former was the type of speech involved in O'Brien,46 which necessitates a less scrutinizing first amendment standard. The latter
goes more to the heart of the first amendment, so it necessitates a
more scrutinizing standard of review. 8
The court acknowledged the problem of applying the O'Brien
test to cable carriage regulations since the channel restrictions
could be seen as a direct burden on speech. However, the court
recognized the fact that the O'Brien test was the least scrutinizing
test available.
Therefore, the court used the O'Brien test to analyze the
FCC's must carry rules. 49 Applying that test, the court held that
the must carry rules (1) were within the constitutional power of
5 1
the FCC, 50 (2) were unrelated to suppression of free expression,

but (3) did not further an important or substantial governmental
interest,5 and (4) imposed a greater incidental burden on expres5 3
sion than essential to further any alleged governmental interest.
In applying the "substantial interest" element of the test, the
court held that the FCC had not shown by concrete evidence the
evil targeted by the rules, which apparently was the potential eradication of local broadcast television due to cable competition. 4 In
applying the "least incidental restriction" element of the test, the
court held that the rules were overly broad. For example, the rules
failed to distinguish profitable local broadcasters from unprofitable
ones, and failed to distinguish small "saturated" cable systems
43. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
44. Regulations that "envince a governmental interest unrelated to the suppression or protection of a particular set of ideas . . . ." Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1450.
45. Either directly by banning speech due to its communicative impact or
indirectly by favoring one group of speakers over another group. Id. at 1450.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 109-117.
47. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1451.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1453-54.
50. Id. at 1443. This is implied from previous Supreme Court approval of
jurisdiction. See id.
51. Id. at 1454. This was conceded arguendo.
52. Id. at 1459.
53. Id. at 1462.
54. Id. at 1458-59.
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from ones with larger channel capacities. 55
It seems unlikely that the Quincy case will be reversed or even
granted a writ of certiorariby the Supreme Court. On August 2,
1985, the FCC withdrew from the appeal of the case.56 The full
Commission, by a three to two vote, even applauded the Quincy
decision.5 7 Chief Justice Warren Burger on September 9, 1985 refused to stay the enforcement of the Quincy decision. 58 On September 10, 1985 the FCC declared that the court's decision had
59
become effective as to the FCC.
However, the FCC has not yet given up on some type of signal
carriage regulation. While recognizing the validity of the Quincy
decision, the FCC on November 14, 1985 filed a notice of proposed
rulemaking to request suggestions for a revised rule that would be
60
constitutional.
BACKGROUND

To understand the constitutional question that faced the
Quincy court, it is necessary to first look at the FCC's longstanding
policy of "localism"-a policy to promote the public interest in
having communities served by free broadcast programming that
caters to local interests and needs. 6 1 The FCC applied its localism
policy to television broadcasting in 1952.62 Moreover, when cable
55. Id. at 1462 & n.55.
56. Calcasieu Cablevision, Inc., No. CAC-8805 (F.C.C. Sept. 10, 1985) (available Jan. 31, 1986, on LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC file). The FCC by this action
dismissed as moot over 230 proceedings that involved the rules. Id.
57. Goodale, Big Media and the Courts, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 12, 1985, at 3, col. 3
n.5.

58. Raleigh News & Observer, Sept. 11, 1985, at 12B, col. 1.
59. Calcasieu Cablevision, Inc., No. CAC-8805 (F.C.C. Sept. 10, 1985) (available Jan. 31, 1986, on LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC file).
60. Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Docket No. 85349 (November 18, 1985) [hereinafter cited as Mandatory Carriage Rules Inquiry]. The FCC's position had thus changed since September 1985 when it stated
that it would not " . . . attempt to devise new mandatory cable carriage rules

consistent with the court's decision." Calcasieu Cablevision, Inc., No. CAC-8805
(F.C.C. Sept. 10, 1985) (available Jan. 31, 1986, on LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC
file). The original comment period was to end on December 30, 1985 but was extended to January 29, 1986 on the petition of the National Association of Broadcasters. Order Granting Motion for Extension of Time to File Comments, Docket
No. 85-349 (December 18, 1985).
61. See generally Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New Technology:
The Broadcast-Cable Controversy, 44 U. CINN. L. REV. 427, 495 (1975).
62. Pearson, Cable: The Thread By Which Television Competition Hangs,
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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systems began operating, the FCC soon decided that it had to find
a way to apply its localism policy to cable services also.
To understand how the Quincy court resolved the first amendment question presented, it is necessary to understand the first
amendment test the court used. The O'Brien test was developed to
be used when a regulation or statute only incidentally burdens
speech, thus requiring a less scrutinizing standard of review.
A.

Economic Competition and Local Stations

Before the birth of cable television, the FCC had decided cases
involving a broadcast license applicant's potential economic competition to an established licensee and any resulting threat to local
service. In those cases, the FCC determined that the public interest required at least one licensee to provide adequate local service.
In FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station,6 3 the Supreme Court
held that the economic competition from the applicant was not a
factor to be considered by the FCC in deciding whether to grant a
radio license to the applicant. 4 In deciding that such potential
competition would only cause mere economic loss to the existing
station, the Court reasoned that a power to deny a license simply
due to increased competition to an existing licensee would allow
the FCC to grant broadcast monopolies, a power not given to the
FCC under the Communications Act.66 The Court stated that economic loss could be considered by the FCC when the competition
from the applicant would cause both stations either to go out of
business for lack of adequate financial support or to fail to render
adequate local service. 6
In Carroll BroadcastingCo. v. FCC,6" 7 the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals restated the Sanders Brothers distinction
between economic injury to a licensee and economic injury to the
public interest.6 The court held that the local public interest is
harmed only when local service is affected.6 9 The public interest is
unaffected if Station A is replaced by Station B, as long as Station
27

800, 801 (1974).
309 U.S. 470 (1940).
Id. at 473.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 475-76.
258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
Id. at 442.
No matter who provides the required service. Id. at 444.

RUTGERS L. REv.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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B provides the required local service.7" Thus the question of
whether Station A makes $5000 or $50,000 is irrelevant to the pub71
lic interest if local service is not adversely affected.
The local programming policy was adopted for broadcast television service in 1952. Since most television markets only had three
or less allocated channels, the number of national networks became fixed at three. 72 However, the FCC's policy of localism and
its attempt to apportion local television service on a nationwide
basis left twenty percent of the American population without any
television service in 1956. This helped to bring about cable televi73
sion as a substitute in those isolated areas.
B. Localism Policy and Cable Television Regulation
A great deal of existing literature has traced the history of
FCC cable regulation.74 This note will briefly highlight that era
with respect to localism and the mandatory signal carriage rules.
As early as May 1958 the FCC was considering the economic
' '75
impact on local television service from "auxiliary services.
Broadcasters challenged cable as a threat to their economic security in the market place, claiming that cable would split television
audiences and cut the broadcasters' revenues. 76 However, the FCC
refused to act due to an inability to determine whether advertisers
would withdraw advertising based on lower ratings, and an inability to predict the amount of financial loss that would cause a
broadcaster to go out of business.7 7 The FCC would involve itself
only when the sole local broadcast service was threatened.7 8
The must carry rules were promulgated along with other cable
70. Id.

71. Id. at 443.
72. Pearson, supra note 62, at 801-02.
73. Hagelin, supra note 61, at 495.
74. See an excellent bibliography found in G.

SHAPIRO,

P. KURLAND & J. MER250 (1983)

CURIO, 'CABLESPEECH:' THE CASE FOR FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION

[hereinafter cited as CABLESPEECH].
75. CATV & TV Repeater Services, Docket No. 12443, 26 F.C.C. 403, 412
(1959).
76. Smith, Primer on the Regulatory Development of CATV (1950-72), 18
How. L.J. 729, 731, 733 (1975).
77. CATV & TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C. at 422.
78. Id. at 438. In Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962),
aff'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963), the FCC found
evidence that a microwave-fed cable system would bring about the demise of a
local television station.
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regulation in 1965.11 Since 1959 the number of cable systems had
tripled. 80 The 1965 regulations were limited in coverage to microwave fed cable systems.8 ' The FCC believed that cable systems
owed their primary duty to those stations that placed the best signals in the community. 82 The FCC reasoned that a cable system's
failure to carry local stations would be contrary to the public interest. 83 The FCC stated that if cable replaced local broadcast service,
the public would lose free service, service to outlying areas, and
service with local control and program selection.8 '
The FCC chose to cast cable's role as a supplemental broadcast service and not as an alternative service.86 The FCC argued
that giving the cable operator the ability to choose to carry a local
station would be inconsistent with that role.""
One consideration for the FCC was the use by a cable subscriber of a switching device which would allow the user to switch
between cable reception and over-the-air antenna reception.87 The
FCC all but ruled out such devices as an alternative cable regulation since cable operators might not provide them to subscribers,
and since switching was an "obvious" deterrent to their use by
subscribers.88 The FCC relied on an assertion that switching de'
vices were "frequently defective." 89
In 1966, the FCC modified the rules and extended them from
microwave fed cable systems to all cable systems. 90 Again the FCC
reasoned that cable systems that failed to carry local stations effectively cut off such stations from the cable system's subscribers. 91
The must carry rules specified four priority types of local stations that the cable operator had to carry on the request of a local
79. First Report & Order in Docket Nos. 14895 & 15233, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as First Report & Order].
80. Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40
Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67, 79 (1967).
81. First Report & Order, supra note 79, at 683-84.
82. Id. at 717.
83. Id. at 705-06.
84. Id. at 699-700.
85. Id. at 700.
86. Id. at 705.
87. See CABLESPEECH, supra note 74, at 144.
88. First Report & Order, supra note 79, at 702-04.
89. Id. at 688.
90. Second Report & Order in Docket Nos. 14895, 15233 & 15971, 2 F.C.C.2d
725, 746 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Second Report & Order].
91. Id. at 774.
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/7
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station. 2 An exception existed when limited channel capacity allowed a cable operator to choose between signals with substantial
duplication. 3 Another exception to mandatory carriage allowed a
cable system to show that a local signal was not in fact present in
the community, or that a good signal was technically
unobtainable."4
When a system's channel capacity was too limited to allow
carriage of all must carry signals of the community, the cable system was required to offer and maintain for each subscriber an adequate switching device.9 5 This provision was deleted by the 1972
rules.9 6
When it promulgated the 1972 rules, the FCC conceded that it
lacked detailed data on cable viewing patterns, but once obtained,
such data would serve as a measure of cable's "possible" impact on
local broadcast service.9 7 The must carry rules were revised to utilize a new thirty-five mile zone in which "local" stations were
deemed located ("market signals"), and to require carriage of stations "significantly viewed" in the cable community."
92. The 1966 rules required a cable system, on request of the relevant station, to carry the signals of all commercial and educational television stations
within whose grade B contour the cable system is located, giving priority to the
following: (1) all stations within whose principal community contours the system
operates; (2) all stations within whose grade A contours the system operates; (3)
all stations within whose grade B contours the system operates; and (4) all television translator stations operating in the community of the system with 100 watts
or higher power. 2 F.C.C.2d at 752, 802. "Contours" are geographical lines wherein
a signal acceptable to the viewer is expected to be available at the outer limits of
service for at least 90 percent of the time at the best 70 percent of receiver locations for the Grade A contour, and at the best 50 percent of receiver locations for
the Grade B contour. Sixth Report and Order in Docket Nos. 8736, 8975, &
9175-Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148, 176 (1952). A "television translator" is a broadcaster that retransmits programs of television broadcasters without
alteration of the original signal. 47 C.F.R. § 74.701(a) (1982).
93. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1103(b) (1966).
94. Second Report & Order, supra note 90, at 753 n.40.
95. Id. at 802; 47 C.F.R. § 74.1103(c) (1966).
96. Cable Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 212 (1972). No explanation was given as to why this provision was deleted.
97. Id. at 169.
98. Id. at 170-71, 230-33. The 1972 rules for cable systems operating in those
communities located outside of all major and smaller television markets (e.g.
Quincy, Washington) essentially added to the 1966 rules (see supra note 92) the
following priority categories: (5) noncommercial educational television broadcast
stations within whose "specified zone" the community of the cable system is located and (6) commercial television broadcast stations that are "significantly
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
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C. PartialFCC Deregulationof Cable
As cable grew due to its increased profitability, the FCC began
to reevaluate its position on cable regulation. In 1979, the FCC
took advantage of substantial cable television broadcast research
available9" to review the continued validity of two cable regulations. 100 The distant signal rules limited the number of distant television signals that could be carried by the cable system. A "distant" signal was defined as one originating from any station
outside of a community's thirty-five mile zone.' °1 The syndicated
program exclusivity rules required, on the request of a local broadcaster, the deletion of a particular network or syndicated programs
from distant signals. 102 The FCC admitted that the distant signal
and the syndicated exclusivity rules had been based on mere
speculation. 10 3
In its 1979 report, the FCC found that cable competition did
not "pose a significant threat to conventional television or to overall broadcasting policies."'O' Broadcast television stations earned
"substantially" more return on their investment than the average
business, so some audience loss to distant stations was acceptable.
The FCC found that audience loss was offset by increases in population, economic activity, and advertising demand. 0 5
In a sharp separate statement, FCC Commissioner Fogarty argued that the public interest was better served by deferring to the
viewed" in the community of the cable system. 47 C.F.R. § 76.57(a)(3)-(4) (1980).
The rules also made similar provisions for major television markets (§ 76.61) and
smaller television markets (§ 76.59). A "specified zone" is that area extending 35
air miles from the reference point in the community, the location of such point
being defined in 47 C.F.R. § 76.53. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(f) (1982). A "significantly
viewed" station is one with a certain share of viewing hours in the surveyed viewing households. 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(k) (1982). This section provides different weekly
share requirements for network and independent stations.
99. The research included case studies of 160 broadcast stations. Inquiry into
the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 715 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Economic Relationship
Inquiry].
100. Id. at 634, 660.
101. Report & Order in Docket Nos. 20988 & 21284-Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663, 667-68 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Syndicated Exclusivity Rules].
102. Id. at 668-69.
103. Economic Relationship Inquiry, supra note 99, at 634.
104. Id. at 661.
105. Id.
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marketplace until experience, rather than speculation, indicated
the need for regulation. The burden of proof should be on those
seeking protection against competition (the television broadcasters), not on the innovators (cable operators).'0
The FCC, as a result of the inquiry, deleted the distant signal
and syndicated exclusivity rules in 1980."°' The FCC commented
that cable competition had improved television service to the public, and would continue to do so in the future, despite the relaxed
distant signal rules.' 08
D.

The O'Brien Test

The Quincy court applied the O'Brien test to invalidate the
must carry rules. In O'Brien, the defendant was prosecuted for the
willful burning of his Selective Service registration certificate.' 0
He did so in public to protest the draft."0 In upholding his conviction and the statute, the United States Supreme Court"' found
that the restricted conduct contained both speech and nonspeech
elements, and that the statute did not prohibit free speech on its
face." 2 The Court then set forth what has generally been relied on
as the test for determining the first amendment validity of regulations which only incidentally burden speech:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the government interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." 3
Applying that test to the statute in question, the Court first
found that the Government had the constitutional power to classify and conscript manpower for military service." 4 Second, the
106. Id. at 949 (separate statement of Comm'r Fogarty).
107. Syndicated Exclusivity Rules, supra note 101, at 665.
108. Id. at 746.
109. 391 U.S. at 369.
110. Id. at 369-70.
111. Chief Justice Warren authored the opinion. Justice Harlan concurred,
and Justice Douglas dissented. Id. at 369, 388-89.
112. Id. at 375-76.
113. Id. at 377.
114. Id.
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Government had an important interest in assuring the continued
availability of issued Selective Service certificates. 15 Third, the
governmental interest was unrelated to the suppression of free expression.' 16 Fourth, since the statute only condemned independent,
noncommunicative actions, it was no more burdensome than essential to further the governmental interest." 7
The O'Brien test found subsequent use in many first amendment cases and has been used in the context of cable television
several times. 1 8
No court before Quincy had analyzed the must carry rules using the O'Brien test. Although the FCC still supported its localism
policy established decades before, the FCC was now deregulating
cable television. One of the last major components of cable regulation left standing was the must carry rules.
ANALYSIS

The Quincy court took a step by step approach in analyzing
the must carry rules under the O'Brien four-part test. First, the
court decided that the O'Brien test was appropriate in this case
even though the must carry rules appeared to burden the speech of
cable operators more than incidentally. Second, assuming that the
use of the O'Brien test was appropriate, the court had trouble finding a substantial governmental interest. Third, assuming such an
interest existed, the court found that the must carry rules were
fatally overbroad and thus Violative of the first amendment. This
note, after analyzing each of these three components, will address
the possible impact of the Quincy decision.
115. Id. at 382.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. E.g., Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d
1396, 1406-07 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1985) (O'Brien used to invalidate a city's policy of
auctioning off the right to provide cable service to certain areas and limiting each
area to one cable operator; procedure was not the least restrictive alternative);
Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 48-51 (O'Brien used to invalidate the pay cable
television rules of the FCC; rules did not serve a substantial governmental interest and were grossly overbroad); Carlson v. Village of Union City, 601 F. Supp.
801, 810-12 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (O'Brien used to uphold a city's revocation of a
cable television franchise); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke,
571 F. Supp. 976, 987-88 (D.R.I. 1983), vacated as moot, 773 F.2d 382 (1st Cir.
1985) (O'Brien used to uphold a state's mandatory access regulations placed on
cable systems).
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A.

Unrelated to Suppression of Free Expression

Is the FCC's interest in preserving free local television broadcasting related to communicative impact or to the suppression of
free expression? If a regulation does not meet this element, it is
not unconstitutional, but merely requires a much more demanding
first amendment test.1 19 A regulation regulates content if "its applicability depends on the message, symbols or images used by the
communicator. ' 120 The must carry rules were designed to ensure
that the public interest was served through guaranteed local
broadcast outlets of expression and opinion; the rules did not guarantee that certain messages were said or not said. From the public's viewpoint, this was neither an expansion nor suppression, but
a preservation of the status quo existing before cable made a significant impact on the television industry. From the cable operator's viewpoint, the rules restricted the choice of channels that it
could carry.
Regardless of what method of enforcement the FCC chose, its
underlying purpose was not the restriction of cable operators, but
the maintenance of local broadcasting. The O'Brien test specifies
that it is the governmental interest, not the regulation itself, which
must be unrelated to the suppression of free speech. The O'Brien
court meant to analyze an interest that reasonably supported the
regulation, not an interest that "really" influenced the legislature
or agency.21
Even if the FCC applied its localism policy to cable television
in direct response to "harmful" communicative conduct, the
Quincy court correctly began (and ended) its analysis with the
O'Brien test. Professor Redish advocates an approach to judicial
first amendment analysis that abandons the content distinction. 2
First the court applies the O'Brien test. If in the "rare" case the
regulation fails the test, it is unconstitutional. In the usual case,
after the regulation passes the test, the court applies a more scrutinizing balancing test.2 3 This is basically the procedure that the
119. Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1484 (1975).
120. Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist
View, 68 GEo. L.J. 727, 745 (1980).
121. Ely, supra note 119, at 1496 n.57.
122. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34
STAN.

L.

REV.

113, 142-43 (1981).

123. Id. The next test is (1) whether the regulation accomplishes the asserted
goal, (2) whether "feasible" less restrictive alternatives are inadequate to accom-
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court in Quincy utilized, but the court simply stopped after applying the O'Brien test.
B.

Important or Substantial Governmental Interest

Regarding this element of the O'Brien test, the issue in
Quincy was whether the must carry rules furthered the "important
or substantial" governmental interest in preserving free local television broadcasting. A "substantial" interest might be more correctly termed a "non-negligible" interest. 2 " This element can be
compared to the "minimum rationality" standard applied to economic regulations challenged on equal protection grounds.'2 5 Professor Ely states that this element as used in O'Brien will rarely
invalidate a regulation if the test is honestly applied, since all regulations to some extent serve the government's goals. 2 Thus, the
"limited nature of judicial inquiry" has been noted regarding this
27
element of the test.1
The Quincy court had serious doubts about the governmental
interest underlying the must carry rules. The court stated that the
FCC had to make more than an unsubstantiated assertion of the
importance of the governmental interest. 28 However, the court
never criticized the FCC's assertion that in order to protect the
public interest the FCC had to ensure that each community had
free local programming. The court only attacked the method used
by the FCC regarding the "threat" of cable to that public interest.
The court even suggested that the must carry rules might be revised by the FCC to enable the rules to pass constitutional muster,1 29 which indicated that the court had no real problem with the
underlying governmental interest. What the court was essentially
attacking was the FCC's lack of justification for the method that
the FCC chose to protect the public interest.
Assuming that the governmental interest is valid, the court in
Quincy had to analyze the rest of this element of the O'Brien
test-whether the must carry rules furthered the FCC's interest in
plish that end, and (3) whether the speaker will have available adequate means to
express the same views to roughly the same audience. Id. at 143.
124. Redish, supra note 122, at 143.
125. Ely, supra note 119, at 1486 & n.18.
126. Id.
127. Redish, supra note 122, at 148 n.205.
128. 768 F.2d at 1455 n.44.
129. Id. at 1463. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.

https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol8/iss2/7

16

1986]

Hobbs: Cable TV's "Must Carry" Rules: The Most Restrictive Alternative -

FCC "MUST CARRY" RULES

free local broadcasting. The rules were designed to ensure a guaranteed audience for local broadcast stations, including cable subscribers. The court spent much time explaining why the FCC's position must fail since the FCC had not in twenty years proved the
"substantiality" of the interest served by the must carry rules.
Clearly the rules furthered that interest, but the real question was
whether the rules were just too broad.
C. Least Restrictive Alternative
The Quincy court held that the must carry rules were not the
least restrictive alternative available to the FCC for furthering the
FCC's substantial interest.'
This holding is basically the major
objection to the must carry rules, even assuming arguendo that all
of the other O'Brien elements are met.
The Quincy court objected primarily to the lack of FCC inquiry into the actual impact of cable on local broadcasting. One
less restrictive alternative to the rules would be to put the burden
on the individual broadcasters to show specific future harm. The
FCC, in its First Report and Order, distinguished Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,131 which allowed the FCC to consider a broadcast license applicant's potential economic harm to existing local
service, as only applying to economic competition between broadcast stations. A cable system replacing local broadcast service
1 32
would not "render the required service.'
However, if the Carroll rationale is applied indirectly to the
competition from cable systems, the individual local station ought
to have the burden to show that (1) the competition from the cable
system will force it to cease local programming, and (2) no other
broadcast television station exists that renders the required local
service. Certainly the cable system might provide local cablecasting
and access channels, and to force the only "localcaster" off the air
would probably require a large percentage of the viewing audience
to be cable subscribers. However, the FCC would still have an interest in ensuring that the remaining nonsubscribers are served.*
Possibly in this case the FCC would then have the power to compel
the cable system to carry the fledgling station if no other local
broadcasters were present to provide the "required service." This
alternative seems sufficiently narrow to meet the O'Brien standard.
130. 768 F.2d at 1462.
131. 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
132. 38 F.C.C. at 701.
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Clearly it is more sensible to put the burden to show harm on one
of a few speakers that will be hurt rather than to unduly burden
all speakers in another class based on a largely unproved and extremely speculative harm.
A test utilized by Judge Skelly Wright in applying the Carroll
rationale in a case involving broadcasters could be adapted to this
area of cable regulation. 133 The broadcaster must present specific
factual data sufficient to support a prima facie case of derogation
of public service. The evidence must raise issues of (1) whether
market revenue potential will cause the broadcaster to suffer significant income loss, (2) whether such loss would compel the
broadcaster to eliminate some or all public service programs, and
(3) whether such loss of programs would not be offset by alterna3
tive programs of another broadcaster.1 '
One less restrictive alternative to the present must carry rules
is the adoption of more narrow must carry rules. However, any per
se requirement that a cable system carry a certain number of local
channels might be unconstitutional absent a showing that the local
television service would be threatened without the carriage.
Another less restrictive alternative would be to require the
cable system 3 to supply switching devices to all subscribers who
request them, or for the FCC to require all television receivers to
carry such devices. However, such a requirement may be unnecessary since viewers who want to see the deleted local station will
spend the small amount for a switch, or simply disconnect the
cable and hook up an antenna. Switching devices would be unnecessary for reception of stations on the UHF band since the coaxial
cable attaches to the separate VHF antenna outlet. 13
The FCC has previously refused to rely on switching devices
as an alternative method of ensuring the continued viability of local broadcasting.137 Ironically, the FCC has more recently suggested the use of a switching device by cable subscribers as an alternative to expanding the must carry rules. The FCC in that
decision refused to require cable systems to carry local subscrip133. WLVA, Inc. v. FCC, 459 F.2d 1286, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
134. Id. at 1297. The House of Representatives had a bill pending in 1982
which would have modified the carriage rules to have them apply only when a
local station had a certain audience share. The bill, H.R. 5949, did not pass.
CABLESPEECH,

supra note 74, at 148 n.44.

135. By the FCC or by the franchising authority.
136. CABLESPEECH, supra note 74, at 144.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
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8
tion television broadcast stations.13
The Quincy court correctly applied the least scrutinizing test
to the must carry rules as its first inquiry. Since the must carry
rules failed the test, the court did not need to apply a more scrutinizing first amendment test, under which the rules certainly would
have failed.

D.

Impact on Cable Systems

The elimination of the mandatory signals carriage rules will
have the largest impact on "saturated" systems with small channel
capacities.13 9 Currently, 12.4 percent of cable subscribers are
served by systems with twelve or fewer channels. 14 0 Such cable systems will not have to drop a popular nonmandatory station just to
squeeze in a mandatory local station. Some markets have many
more than twelve local signals that must be carried on a twelve
channel cable system.14 1 The FCC will no longer need to require
such "saturated" systems to spend huge amounts of money to rebuild their systems in order to increase channel capacity to the
point that they can carry all mandatory signals. 42
The impact on larger, multitiered systems will be less, but not
insignificant. The FCC has required that a cable system that
desires to move a mandatory signal from the first tier to a second
or third tier14 3 must provide free converters to subscribers to allow
viewing of the mandatory channel, at a great cost to the cable system. 44 Such a high cost seems unnecessary when a simple switching service would suffice.

However, technological advances could assist a saturated cable
system in carrying more stations without expanding capacity. New
138. The FCC exempted cable systems from mandatory carriage of subscription television stations, which transmit scrambled signals. Signal Carriage
Rules-STV, 77 F.C.C.2d 523, 528-29 (1980).
139. I.e., those with twelve channels or slightly more.
140. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1439 n.9. 38.7 percent of all cable systems have
fewer than twenty channels. Id.
141. Saturated Cable Systems, supra note 29, at 711.
142. See id. at 710-11.
143. The first tier is a basic service, usually having all must carry stations, for
which the subscriber may not need a converter box. The secondary tiers often
require a converter box. Cable systems often lease these converters to their subscribers. See, e.g., Coin-West, Inc., 95 F.C.C.2d 1219 (1984).
144. The cost to the Coin-West cable system of providing the free converters
would have been $200,000. Id. at 1220.
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bandwidth compression systems such as Comband allow the carriage of two video signals over one 6 MHz cable channel without
material degradation. The FCC has approved such systems for use
with must carry signals. 4 ' Comband could be used to effectively
double a cable system's channel capacity, thus preventing the need
for many saturated systems to rebuild their systems to expand
capacity.
The end of the must carry rules will create the need for cable
operators and local franchising authorities to make some choices.
The cable system must decide whether to drop any or all of its
must carry signals. Cable systems do not have to pay local stations
in order to carry their signals. 4 " However, the higher cost of other
channels may be offset by the attraction of new subscribers. Another question for the cable system that wants to delete some local
channels is whether to breach a franchise contract that requires
147
the system to carry all local stations.
One impact of Quincy will certainly be the increase of revenues for cable operators. The losers may be the less popular stations. Such stations include those on the UHF band which due to
their frequency allocations suffer from a picture quality that is
equal to that of stations on VHF only when the UHF signal is on

cable. 148
CONCLUSION

One of the last major FCC programming regulations of cable
television was the must carry rules. The FCC adopted its regulatory policy regarding cable in order to preserve local broadcast programming by way of protecting local broadcasters. When cable developed as a viable medium, the FCC found that it no longer
needed to regulate the number of distant signals that a cable system carried. Studies concluded that the original premises concerning the impact of cable on local programming were groundless.
Somehow, in the wake of deregulation, the FCC forgot about the
145. General Electric Co. Commercial Electronics Products Dept., No. CSR2826 (F.C.C. May 31, 1985) (available on Jan. 31, 1986, on LEXIS, Fedcom library, FCC file).
146. Cable systems must pay for importing distant stations. Price & Nadel,
"Must Carry:" The End: Ways to Cope With Change, The Nat'l L.J., Sept. 30,
1985, at 15, col. 2.
147. See, e.g., Cox Cable New Orleans, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 594 F.
Supp. 1452, 1461 n.4 (E.D. La. 1984).
148. Price & Nadel, supra note 146, at 50, col. 1.
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application of its studies to the must carry rules.
Even though supported by a valid governmental interest of ensuring free local broadcast programming, the must carry rules were
fatally overbroad from the start. The FCC started out on the right
foot in 1958 by not promulgating broad cable regulations and by
deciding to review the "threat" of cable on a case by case basis.
The Quincy court did not suggest any alternatives to the must
carry rules. In 1965, the FCC dismissed applying the Carroll rationale directly to the substitution of a cable service for local
broadcast service. However, the FCC could have applied the Carroll rationale indirectly to petitions by broadcasters who could
show that a cable system's presence would actually eradicate all
free local programming in the community. Whether the cable system could provide the local service itself would be irrelevant to the
inquiry. However, the chance of total displacement of all free local
service in a community by a cable system seems to be slim at best.
The most apparent effect of Quincy is the potential financial
gain to both cable operators and cable programmers. The rules
were costly to cable systems, especially "saturated" ones. Cable
programmers will be able to sell more of their services to more
cable systems.
Have the "listeners" really been harmed by guaranteeing that
the "speakers" have first amendment rights to carry the programs
of their choice? Since television viewers can with relative ease
make their own choice whether to watch either cable or broadcast
television, the Quincy decision greatly broadens cable operators'
constitutional rights while not substantially affecting those of the
viewing public.
Robert B. Hobbs, Jr.
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